Collective Action Problems Galore

Earlier in the semester we learned that collective action problems are situations in which individuals have an incentive not to cooperative in group-work if they believe others will cooperate instead. These problems often result in free riding and prisoner’s dilemma type situations, as one party is only looking out for his or her own self interests. Since this lecture back in early October, I have encountered collective action problems in all three of my other classes.

This video clip from a Dilbert episode explains a prisoner's dilemma: 

More recently, in my American Government class, we spent a great deal of time discussing collective dilemmas, or situations that arise when the goals of two groups differ. These are fairly common, especially in politics when people must work together to accomplish a single goal. There are three different types of collective dilemmas. The first type is a principal-agent problem, or a problem that arises when there is a conflict of interest between two groups or individuals who must make a decision. This may occur when one party has information that the other is lacking, or when the two parties disagree on what action should be taken. The second type of a collective dilemma is a coordination problem. These types of problems occur when one does not know what the other party is going to do, yet still needs to negotiate a problem. The example my Professor gave here was two cars that are about to crash. Finally, the third types of collective dilemmas are collective action problems, which we learned about in Poli Sci 101.

In my American Government class, we learned about collective dilemmas when we read “The Theory of Groups and Organizations,” a chapter in Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Olson thought that small groups were the answer to collective-action problems. Larger groups will have higher initial costs and they will not be able to further their common interests as much as a small group. Small groups, however, have fewer opportunities to free ride, and individuals get a larger “piece of the pie” in the end (Olson 28). 

Photo: People and the Commons

In my Environment 201 class, we also learned about similar situations with Garret Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons. Many people pollute because they feel that they will not make a big enough impact to make a considerable difference. Since they think others are recycling, they feel it is unnecessary for them to contribute. This obviously becomes an issue when everyone thinks with this mindset.

The approaches I learned about in my Environment class and Poli Sci 101 were the most similar. Both suggest that equal cooperation is the most logical solution. However, in my American Government class, Olson believes that free riding is inevitable, and the only way to prevent free riding is to eliminate the opportunity by spreading the responsibility among fewer individuals.

Image by James Yang

A common, real life example of a collective action problem, especially for students, is working on a group project. With an extremely high incentive to free ride, what is the most efficient approach to assure equal participation? Is it better when professors make group members complete task-lists and peer evaluations to ensure an equal division of work, or is it better to just limit group sizes?  Is forcing an equal level or cooperation enough, or is Olson correct in saying that the only way to truly eliminate the possibility of free riding to eliminate large groups? Personally, after working on many group projects, I have found that free riding still occurs in small groups, and it can be very difficult and uncomfortable to give a fellow classmate a poor ranking on a peer evaluation.

The grading system in Poli Sci 101 is a bit untraditional in that students are able to decide which assessments to complete, and how heavily each of these assignments are weighted. There are four options: conventional essays, blogging, a solo new media project, and a group project. Each student is given six units of kapital to invest in whichever assignment, or combination of assignments, he or she chooses. A unit of kapital acts a multiplier. For example, since each of the four assignments is worth 4,000 points, if I were to invest three units of kapital in the group project, my final score would be multiplied by three.

When I was deciding how to invest my kapital for this class, I chose not to participate in a group project. My decision was partially based on my lack of creativity, but also because I feared that it would result in a collective action problem. If one of my group members had less kapital invested in our project, how could I be convinced he or she would be completely dedicated? It would also not be fair to expect the same amount of work from each group member if one is receiving significantly fewer points.

Image from SaltMangoTree.net

After reflecting on the solutions that Olson and Hardin offer, I realized that when applied to group projects, collective action problems still exist; small groups sizes and an attempt to mandate equal participation still do not prevent free-riding. However, if everyone is made aware of exactly how much each person is able to benefit from the work, than the work can be divided accordingly. If I know that my partner can only earn 4,000 points from our project, and am trying to earn 24,000 points, I would take on more of the work. In this case, my partner is not free-riding because I am receiving a larger benefit. While I originally thought the use of kapital may be result in free-riding, I now think it could be an alternative, possibly even more efficient, solution to collective action problems.